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"ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE, WITH LIBERTY
AND JUSTICE FOR ALL": LESSONS FROM
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE FOR
NEW DEMOCRACIES*
PATRICIA M. WALD**
INTRODUCTION
EflIS summer I had the privilege of traveling to Bulgaria as a member
X of a United States delegation monitoring that country's first open
election in forty-six years. In that small country, the tension between
minority cultures clamoring for equality and pro-democratic forces call-
ing for a unified front against Communist rule was electrifying. Indeed,
within months of the overthrow of the Communist regime, historically
persecuted Turks has formed their own party and in the June election
they gained almost ten percent of the Assembly seats, thus producing a
swing vote in Bulgaria's future government. Under the Communists, the
Turks had been forced to change their names, and were denied access to
schools, forbidden circumcision rites and barred from their mosques.
Even the Turkish language and native costumes were banned. In the
year preceding the 1989 overthrow of the one-party Communist govern-
ment, 330,000 Turks emigrated from Bulgaria. But even as the anti-
Communist opposition in Bulgaria mobilized for the coming elections in
the first half of 1990, some of its most enthusiastic democratic advocates
still resisted full equality for the Turks.
In neighboring Romania (where my husband was an election monitor),
the Hungarians in Transylvania were the unassimilated minority. In
Czechoslovakia, deep-felt historical tensions between Czechs and Slovaks
continued to endanger that country's future as a united democratic re-
public. Although Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania do not have
our active tradition of judicial or constitutional protection of individual
rights, those countries are now preparing to write new constitutions for
submission to their General Assemblies within the next two years. Those
Assemblies will contain some representatives of minority cultures, who,
promisingly, were allowed to vote relatively freely in the recent elections.
Over the long term, however, as the new democracies springing up in
Eastern Europe absorb historically oppressed minorities and establish
independent judiciaries, those judiciaries will have to accommodate the
abiding tension between national integrity and the rights of minorities to
* This article is based on a speech delivered as the Noreen E. McNamara Memorial
Lecture on October 4, 1990 at Fordham University School of Law.
** Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. B.A., 1948, Connecticut College for Women; LL.B., 1951, Yale Law School.
The author wishes to thank her former law clerk Jonathon Siegal, J.D., 1989, Yale Law
School, for his assistance in preparing this Article.
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equal treatment and respect. It is in this global context, then, that le
may reflect on the successes and failures of our own American experien
in granting equality and liberty to all people in a nation that is one and,
indivisible.
Recent events to the north of us, in Canada, suggest that two or even
three centuries of harmonizing cultural differences do not forever immu-
nize a country from the threat of separatism. Canada's calm surface has
cracked under social pressures, revealing a country deeply divided by ge-
ography, history and divergent languages and cultures. The head of its
Liberal Party warns ominously that "[the world has known other serene
communities that have come apart from internal tensions."'
We ourselves are not yet home free. One columnist wrote recently
"America, alone among the multi-ethnic countries of the world, has
managed to assimilate its citizenry into a common nationality [but) we
are now doing our best to squander this great achievement." 2 As vener-
able an American institution as the jury-described once as "dependable
neighbors who... uphold the community canons" 3-may be threatened
by racial divisiveness. Earlier this year there was a newspaper story
about a D.C. juror in a more mundane criminal trial who reportedly
announced that she would not send any young black man to jail for drugs
whatever the evidence showed. 4
So we had best speak with humility as well as pride when we hold up
as a model for others our record in melding "one nation indivisible, with
liberty and justice for all." There is indeed a symbiotic link between
these two phrases, so familiar to us all from recitations of the pledge of
allegiance. America's unique civic culture is, in the words of Kenneth
Karst, a "mixture of behavior and belief that infuses our law and our
institutions, transcending race, religion, and ethnicity, allowing individ-
ual citizens to preserve their separate cultural identities and still identify
themselves as Americans."
1. Malcolm, The World Beyond Plain Vanilla: Immigration Has Accentuated Can-
ada's Diversity, NY Times, July 8, 1990, § 4, at 2.
2. Krauthammer, The Tribalization of America, Washington Post, Aug. 6, 1990, at
Al l; see also Bernstein, The Arts Catch Up With a Society in Disarray, NY Times, Sept. 2,
1990, § 2, at 12 (" 'The contemporary ideal is not assimilation but ethnicity .... We
used to say e pluribus unum. Now we glorify pluribus and belittle unum. The melting
pot yields to the Tower of Babel.' ") (quoting A. Schlesinger, Jr.) (emphasis added).
Bernstein notes that
mT1he tendency now is for individuals, particularly members of minority groups,
to identify primarily with their groups rather than with the common culture
.... In academic circles... the very idea of a common culture is under assault,
seen merely as a tool used by what is called the white, male, heterosexual estab-
lishment to exercise its 'hegemony.'
Bernstein, The Arts Catch Up With a Society in Disarray, NY Times, Sept. 2, 1990, § 2, at
13.
3. K. Karst, Belonging to America 102 (1989). I am indebted to Professor Karst's
fine book for setting me thinking on several of the themes in this Article.
4. Klaidman, Racial Politics in the Jury Room, Legal Times, April 23, 1990, at 1, 7.
5. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C.L. Rev.
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But in fact, our nation has an unsettling history of uneasy intercultural
relations; slavery and segregation of blacks is the most invidious but by
no means the only example of our darker side. Jews were forbidden to
vote in most states until the mid-nineteenth century, and Asians in the
West were subjected to special taxes and forbidden from owning land or
testifying against whites. During the infamous "Red Scare" following
World War I, there were bans on foreign languages in private as well as
public schools and criminal prosecutions for expression of anti-American
sentiments. Iowa's governor at one point threatened to forbid the use of
foreign languages over the telephone.
Thus, by exercising its constitutional authority to decide claims by mi-
norities denied liberty and justice, our federal judiciary has often occu-
pied a definitive role in the unifying process. It has ruled directly on the
political rights of religious, cultural, racial and ethnic groups to vote,
organize and express themselves. Moreover, it has mediated the omni-
present tension between demands for constant and uniform national val-
ues and claims of citizens bonded to distinct ways of life formed by vastly
different origins, creeds and religions. At times, our courts have facili-
tated the inclusion of these groups in a truly democratic society; at
others, unfortunately, they have perpetuated their exclusion from equal
citizenship.
Tonight I would like to examine how well the courts have performed
their unique melding role in American life. This examination will per-
haps enlighten the "dos" and "don'ts" for newly emerging democracies,
which are beset with their own ethnic and tribal divisions.
I. ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE
Following the American Revolution but prior to the Constitution's
ritification, the thirteen states were separate, sovereign nations united in
a loose confederation. The central government was weak: it lacked the
power to impose taxes, it could not enforce its laws against rebelling
states, and it generally depended on the good will of the states for its
operation.6 Our Constitution changed that. The peoples of the several
states joined together to form one sovereign nation, the United States,
declaring that its Constitution and laws would be the supreme law of the
land and would override the laws of the separate states when necessary.7
Several early Supreme Court decisions by Chief Justice John Marshall
solidified the power of the national government in crucial ways, paving
303, 363 (1986). Madison, of course, thought that a multiplicity of different factions or
groups would affirmatively help to unify the nation by tempering the effect of any one
group's power; individuals and groups opposed on one issue would find themselves
aligned on others. See The Federalist No. 10, at 50 (J. Madison) (revised ed. 1901).
6. See, eg., The Federalist No. 16, at 80-85 (J. Madison) (revised ed. 1901) (advan-
tages of national constitution); The Federalist No. 15, at 76 (J. Madison) (revised ed.
1901) (perils confronting union).
7. See Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale LJ. 1425, 1439-40 (1987).
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the way for a national commercial economy and validating the institu-
tional bases for a national polity. One of these cases was Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee,8 a case featuring a conflict between a state court's adju-
dication of the rights of local landowners and the provision of a national
treaty settling land claims arising out of the Revolutionary War. Mar-
shall's Supreme Court ruled that under the Constitution, any state-court
judgment on a question of federal law could be appealed for final decision
to the United States Supreme Court. This ruling insured early on that
the interpretation of federal law and treaties would be uniform through-
out the United States, a vital component of a strong, unified nation that
had to deal with foreign nations. Without it, differing state-court inter-
pretations might have blunted the impact of federal laws.
The Marshall Court also decided M'Culloch v. Maryland,9 a case that
expanded the scope and established the supremacy of the national gov-
ernment's power. Congress, over opposition from the states, had incor-
porated a national bank. Maryland imposed a tax on paper issued by the
bank, which M'Culloch, the cashier, declined to pay. The Supreme
Court held that although the Constitution did not expressly authorize the
national government to charter a bank, Congress' power to enact all laws
"necessary and proper" to execute expressly granted powers was broad
enough to encompass the creation of a bank that handled the nation's
money. The state tax then, was a nullity because a "power to tax...
[was] a power to destroy."' Thus, national institutions were immunized
from predatory attacks by the states, which enabled them to carry on
with national business.
The Marshall Court's trilogy on national power was completed in Gib-
bons v. Ogden." The state of New York had granted Ogden a monopoly
on steamboat traffic between New York and New Jersey. The Court in-
validated the monopoly on the grounds that it was inconsistent with a
federal statute governing water traffic. Even without positive action by
the national Congress, the Constitution's grant to Congress of power
over interstate commerce implied that the individual states had limited
power to interfere.
These three cases, which the Marshall Court decided over an eight-
year period, played a vital role in defining the respective realms of state
and national regulatory power and binding the economic interests of an
assortment of quarreling states into one nation. Marshall possessed a
vision of a great and powerful "one nation indivisible," and his Court's
decisions were instrumental in transforming that vision into reality.
8. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
9. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
10. Id. at 327.
11. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
[Vol. 59
LESSONS FOR NEW DEMOCRACIES
II. WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL
The creation of an American nation, however, could not be accom-
plished merely by abolishing trade barriers between states or enhancing
national powers. Americans were a remarkably diverse people. The
vastness of the nation, its revolutionary birth and its immigrant heritage
all militated against the development of a homogeneous culture, which
could foster national bonding. Indeed, a tolerance of pluralism had been
an American civic ideal from the very beginning. In breaking away from
the control of class-ridden Britain, where citizens were accorded special
privileges by right of birth, our forefathers declared in the Declaration of
Independence that it was a self-evident truth that "all men are created
equal. 12
The paradoxical task our nation's builders set for themselves was to
create one nation indivisible not by suppressing the differences among
our peoples but by treating them all equally in the political and legal
arenas. It was a radical but correct notion, one still worthy of emulation
200 years later. Our nation's experience in implementing it is another
matter, however, worthy more of close study than blind imitation.
For almost two centuries, the ideal of equality had to coexist with
practices antithetical to it. Thomas Jefferson, the author of our Declara-
tion of Independence, owned slaves, 3 and the Constitution contained
several clauses protecting slavery from being outlawed or too closely reg-
ulated. " Nor was it mere accident that the Declaration of Independence
used the word "men" to describe those created equal; women designedly
could not vote and for the most part were socially and economically sub-
jected to the will of their male relatives. 5 Wealth and land ownership
restrictions limiting the right to vote were also widespread. 6 Given the
practices of the time, the Declaration of Independence might more accu-
rately have read, "all white, propertied males are created equal, the rest
are not." A good portion of the activity of our federal judiciary in the
200 years since has been spent dealing with the tensions between our
egalitarian ideals and our actual practices.
In the early years of the Republic, the Supreme Court's record was not
12. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
13. See Cohen, Thomas Jefferson and the Problem of Slavery, 56 J. Am. Hist. 503, 506
(1969).
14. See, eg., U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (slaves to count as three-fifth of a person
when determining apportionment of representatives); id. at art. I, § 9, cL I (Congress
may not prohibit importation of slaves prior to 1808); id. at art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring
return of fugitive slaves); id. at art. V (Constitution may not be amended to prohibit
importation of slaves prior to 1808).
15. See Edwards, Women and the Law: From Abigail to Sandra, 52 U. Cin. L. Rev.
967, 969 (1983). But see, e.g., Nelson, Address Given at the Fourth Annual International
Law Symposium, 9 Whittier L. Rev. 393, 395 (1987) (prior to 1776 equality of women
and men in United States existed out of economic necessity; after the Revolution, there
was a reversion to traditional sex roles).
16. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 684 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
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uplifting. While the original Constitution explicitly countenanced slav-
ery, by the middle of the nineteenth century the issue of slavery had in-
flamed the nation. Striving for compromise, the political branches of the
government agreed to ban the extension of slavery to United States terri-
tories that had not yet become states. The Court then abrogated that
political compromise in its infamous Dred Scott 17 decision, ruling that a
black could not be a citizen of the United States. After the bloody Civil
War that followed, our Constitution was amended to provide expressly
that no state should deny to any person the "equal protection" of the
laws. But even then, the Supreme Court was agonizingly slow to imple-
ment this egalitarian edict.
In Plessy v. Ferguson,"3 the Court proclaimed that the fourteenth
amendment had as its object "absolute equality of the two races before
the law," but ruled that "in the nature of things it could not have been
intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce ... a
commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either."19
"Separate but equal" facilities, Plessy held, were constitutionally
sufficient.
Some fifty years later, in Korematsu v. United States,20 the Supreme
Court again countenanced discrimination based solely on race. In the
impassioned aftermath of Pearl Harbor, the Court, while giving formal
obeisance to the ideal of equality enshrined in the Constitution, nonethe-
less held that the "pressing public necessity" created by the war empow-
ered the government to intern, without evidence of any disloyalty, 70,000
Japanese-Americans for the conflict's duration.
Not until 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education,2 did the Supreme
Court rule that state-mandated segregation of the races was anathema to
the egalitarian ideal. And only in 1970, nearly two decades after it in-
structed local school authorities to desegregate "with all deliberate
speed," did the Court finally order an immediate halt to segregation in
the public schools.
Even then, the Court lagged in extending Brown's promise of racial
equality to other areas of the law. Less than two years after Brown, the
Court, in Naim v. Naim,22 evaded a ruling on the constitutionality of
Virginia's ban on interracial marriages on grounds that the record was
inadequate. It took ten years for the Court finally to conclude, in the
1967 case Loving v. Virginia,23 that "restricting the freedom to marry
solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause."'24
17. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
18. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
19. Id. at 544.
20. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22. 350 U.S. 985 (1956); Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam).
23. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
24. Id. at 12.
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The pattern that emerges from Plessy to Korematsu and from Brown to
Naim and Loving is that of a Supreme Court consistently proclaiming
racial equality as an abstract constitutional ideal, but bowing to the per-
ceived reality of a nation too timid or fearful or hostile to embrace it.2
This persistent tension between our nation's unifying ideal of equality
and its countervailing social traditions is an important fact that constitu-
tion-builders in newly emerging democracies must recognize and accom-
modate. Even in a nation with an independent judiciary, imbued from its
founding with the authority to invalidate acts of the executive or legisla-
ture, constitutional guarantees of equality are not self-enforcing. In their
perceptions of what a noble ideal may require and how it may be
achieved, our courts have historically been influenced by the pervasive
legal cultures and traditions of their time.
Judges, even when insulated from politics or the fear of removal, still
experience and respond to this antithetical tension between ideals and
political reality. Their responses in cases like Dred Scott and Brown v.
Board of Education, which expose deeply held, conflicting beliefs and
practices, have the potential to undermine or reinforce national unity.
Equality of treatment is fundamental to a nation composed of disparate
peoples, but often it does not come without pain or disruption. Yet the
perception of progress-or its lack-by those suffering the yoke of ine-
quality also has much to do with a society's integrity and oneness. Thus,
as the story of the D.C. jury suggests, we worry that urban blacks in
America, restive at the pace of progress towards full equality, have begun
to turn their backs on the institutions underlying our justice system.
In deciding and granting relief in cases of great import, courts thus
have to calculate the dimensions of the constitutional injustice and the
resistance of the popular culture to relief. Some commentators urge that
the Supreme Court wait until political sentiment has settled before find-
ing and enforcing new and often controversial rights in the Constitution;
they say that would have been the wiser course with the abortion debate
in the 1970s. Others criticize the Court for not moving swiftly enough to
enforce basic rights even when political sentiment is lagging, which hind-
sight suggests as the proper course in Korematsu.
The Justices of our Supreme Court have not always been ready to
translate constitutional ideals into reality; they have often preferred to
articulate the ideal of equality but to leave its fulfillment to a later day.
Like other citizens, judges live within the traditions that shape society.
Like other citizens, they find it difficult to shake off society's mainstream
traditions. When those traditions are strongly anti-egalitarian, as they
certainly are in many parts of the world, even an express promise of
equality enshrined in a nation's constitution may not easily be realized.
25. See, eg., D. Provine, Case Selection in the United States Supreme Court 59-62
(citing contemporary materials); Elman & Silver, The Solicitor General's Office. Justice
Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 Harv. L Rev.
817, 845-47 (1987).
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Thus, it is probably not wise for our foreign friends-if they look to us
as a model-to expect that courts, even a truly independent judiciary,
will solve deeply rooted conflicts between diverse subgroups within their
societies quickly. The great strides in the 1960s towards realizing Ameri-
can egalitarian ideals came out of turbulent political struggle. Over the
long term, our nation's courts have more frequently followed political
actions than led them.
III. "TRADION, TRADION"
Yet that is not the whole story. Courts can play a mighty role in ad-
vancing the course of national unity by steadily reducing the tensions
between traditional mores and constitutional ideals, and finally by trans-
lating those ideals into behavior. They do so not only by their ultimate-
if belated-actions in enforcing constitutional mandates in profoundly
divisive situations like Brown and Loving, but by their steady recognition
of struggling minorities' rights in less high-profile cases. Discrete cul-
tural groups are not always seeking affirmative rights-to vote or to
marry: they often want simply to be left alone and to do their own thing,
however different from their neighbors'. Tolerance, as much as political
equality, is essential to a unified society. It is the Supreme Court that
speaks for the nation's most basic values; its words carry a special imper-
ative in creating and encouraging our sense of nationhood.
At critical junctures of history, it is the Court that must articulate the
traditions and practices in American life that compose a civic culture to
which all Americans can commit their loyalty and obedience. Many of
these values are not expressly provided in the Constitution but must be
drawn from its broad generalities. Though Korematsu stands out as a
tragic exception, over our national lifetime many judicially proclaimed
rights have promoted tolerance for cultural differences as an overriding
civic ideal and have protected unpopular and religious minorities in times
of political disfavor. Judicial proclamations of the rights of Jehovah's
Witnesses not to salute the flag and of German-Americans after World
War I to educate their children privately are two stirring examples.
Clearly, under our constitutional system, it is easier for judges26 than
legislators to act as long-term guardians of the nation's lasting traditions
because they are life-tenured and insulated from the need to seek reelec-
tion. It thus falls to them to sort out and define these core traditions. As
we all know, the American judiciary must confront those who question
its legitimacy and its authority to lay down the law in vital areas of pri-
vate and national life. Oliver Wendell Holmes told us 100 years ago that
the law is what the courts say it is. The adherents of critical legal studies
now repeat his cry: law, they say, is only an expression of the will of the
human powers that reign at any given point.
Yet I do not think that most of us-lawyers, law professors, judges-
26. See A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 23-28 (1962).
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really believe that. We believe that the overriding principles derived
from our Constitution should, and in most cases do, express more than
the personal preferences of the nine Justices who sit on our Supreme
Court; they reflect the history, traditions and fundamental values of our
society as it has grown and evolved over time.
Of course, different judges at different times will find different themes
in our history and traditions or apply them differently to new situations.
Their views will be shared by the rest of the citizenry to greater or lesser
degrees at different times.27 Still, the courts have settled many once bit-
terly divisive issues for all time: the income tax, segregation, fair-labor
standards, the right of workers to organize. Other constitutional contro-
versies, over prayer in our public schools, for example, do not die so
easily, but simmer for long periods. Some say that in those circum-
stances the Court itself acts as a kind of social safety valve: through
Justices who possess diverse political and philosophic persuasions and
are appointed for life by several Presidents, the Court provides an arena
in which the schisms of the nation, its passions and frustrations, can be
played out. Our nation has entrusted to the courts the role of deriving
from the Constitution's generalities those unifying values and rights that
are, as the Court has said, "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition. 28
Yet our history has shown that there are subtle dangers in this process
of derivation. The use of tradition to identify core constitutional values
can be divisive when applied to claims by individuals or groups that have
never been in the nation's mainstream. Too literal a use of tradition as a
benchmark may alienate and isolate minority cultures.
This tension has surfaced in such recent cases as Bowers v. Hardwick.29
Michael Hardwick was arrested for engaging in sexual relations with an-
other man in his own bedroom. Although he was not in fact prosecuted,
Hardwick's behavior was, in the state of Georgia, a crime punishable by
a twenty-year prison term. He brought suit in federal court against the
State Attorney General, asserting that Georgia's sodomy law violated the
United States Constitution. The Supreme Court upheld the Georgia
law.30
Hardwick's claim that he had a constitutional right to choose a man as
a sexual partner was arguably in line with earlier Supreme Court cases
establishing a sphere of autonomy for intimate personal relations. A per-
son's right to marry,31 to procreate32 or to use contraceptives to prevent
27. See Hammond, Constitutional Faith, Legitimating Myth. Civil Religion, 14 Law
and Social Inquiry 377, 377 (1989).
28. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)) (Powell, J.).
29. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
30. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195-96.
31. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
32. See id.
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procreation,33 and a woman's right to an abortion in the first trimester,34
had all been recognized by the Supreme Court as fundamental, and thus
beyond the power of the state to interfere. In ruling against Hardwick,
the Court limited these rulings to the realm of "family, marriage, and
procreation," rather than viewing them as specific aspects of an individ-
ual's general freedom to control intimate associations with others.
The Bowers Court relied heavily on its view that proscriptions against
homosexuality were traditional in America and in those European na-
tions from which America derived its traditions. The Court noted that
the original thirteen states of the Union forbade homosexuality at the
time they ratified the Bill of Rights, that all but five of the states did so in
1868 when the fourteenth amendment was ratified, and that all fifty
states did so prior to 1961. Chief Justice Burger, concurring separately,
commented that homosexual sodomy was a capital crime under Roman
law and had been condemned by Blackstone. The long history of those
proscriptions made it, according to the Court, "facetious" to claim in
1986 that Georgia's ban was invalid under the Constitution.
However one feels about the result in Bowers, the anomaly in accord-
ing such extreme deference to historical tradition is that it might equally
well be given to a variety of other commonplace, but now out-of-bounds
traditions, such as discrimination against blacks, women, Jews, Asian-
Americans or any other subgroup.
Similarly, a potential for tyranny by tradition arises out of constitu-
tional claims by people who affirmatively choose to live differently from
their neighbors. Michael H. v. Gerald D.35 concerned the relationships
between four people: Michael, Carole, Gerald and Victoria. Carole and
Gerald were married; Victoria was alleged to be the daughter of Carole
and Michael, conceived during an extramarital affair that continued in-
termittently during the first three years of Victoria's life. Reconciled
thereafter, Carole and Gerald sought to prevent Michael from contact
with Victoria.
Michael brought suit, seeking a declaration that he was Victoria's fa-
ther and entitled to visitation rights. Applying a state law that provided
that a child born to a married couple living together was conclusively
presumed to be their child, the California courts denied Michael's claim
and the United States Supreme Court upheld that judgment. The
Court's plurality opinion, while acknowledging that aspects of the par-
ent-child relationship had been held beyond state interference, nonethe-
less refused to apply this principle of intrafamily deference to the
relationship between an unwed father and his child when the mother of
the child was married to another man. The Court noted that American
traditions did not acknowledge the unwed natural father's parental rights
33. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
34. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
35. 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
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over the child, and traditions derived from earlier cultures positively de-
nied any such rights. The court assumed that specific tradition overrode
any larger traditions, such as those regarding the general rights of
parents.
There is much unresolved tension in those cases between the Court's
canvassing of traditions and its fair appraisal of the rights of those who
live in nontraditional ways. Tradition can be a lifeless, as well as nour-
ishing, spring for courts seeking to apply constitutional values, like toler-
ance or privacy, to specialized situations. In some cases, the Court has
realized this. For many years, our much treasured freedom of expression
has coexisted with laws making it illegal to bum or otherwise defile the
flag of the United States. Indeed, a year ago, the United States and forty-
eight states had statutes barring flag burning.36 Yet this tradition did not
prevent the Supreme Court from ruling that the burning of a flag was
constitutionally protected. In Michael H., the Court could similarly have
held that the larger tradition of protecting parental rights prevailed over
the tradition of nonrecognition of unwed fathers' rights. In sum, our
experience suggests that specific traditions must be carefully scanned to
-discern their conformity with larger ideals; the danger to an inclusive
society of rigid adherence to past patterns of behavior, which excludes
some people from important rights or intercedes too deeply in their pri-
vate lives, is evident.
And, conversely, in any integrated society there must be limits on judi-
cial protection of peoples' rights to be different. A nation may aspire to
be a pluralistic society that values and encourages diversity, but if it is to
remain one nation, it cannot allow every group within society to live en-
tirely by its own values. Let me give you an example. Last year, in New
York City, a man killed his wife with a hammer after she confessed that
she was having an adulterous affair. He received a sentence of probation
because the judge found he was a Chinese immigrant who had lived in
America for less than three years. The judge admitted testimony that in
China marriages are so sacrosanct that a husband, learning his wife was
unfaithful, could reasonably be expected to become enraged and to act
violently. 8 This may be pluralism run amok. For persons adopting
America as their homeland there has to be a point where a foreign birth-
right cannot provide a refuge from fundamental American values.
36. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2551 & n.1 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
37. Three Justices of the Court have concurred in an opinion by Justice Scalia, ex-
pressly stating that "a constitutional theory must be wrong if its application contradicts a
clear constitutional tradition." Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729,
2749 n.2 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (tradition of patronage proves that patronage is not
unconstitutional). Justice Scalia dismisses "the customary invocation of Brown" to refute
this argument as "unsupportable," on the grounds that the equal protection clause clearly
forbids segregation, and that segregation does not have a tradition of unchallenged valid-
ity. Id. at 2748 n.l.
38. See Assael, Wife-Killer May Get Probation, Manhattan Lawyer, Mar. 14, 1989, at
11.
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IV. THE INDMDUAL, THE GROUP AND THE NATION
And finally, of late, we have seen still another twist on the problems of
multicultural diversity in a nation like ours: our courts face an ironic
reverse discrimination problem arising from individual minority mem-
bers claiming that their basic rights as full American citizens have been
taken away by society's over-deference to the subculture in which they
live. One such case involved the tension within Native American tribes
between their desire to preserve their own culture, and the isolation, pov-
erty and exploitation from which some of their members seek to escape.
Native Americans have cultural traditions that differ in important
ways from those of other citizens, particularly with regard to rearing
children. At least until quite recently the mainstream American tradi-
tion has been that of the nuclear family: parents raise their own chil-
dren, maintaining close control over their activities. In some Native
American tribes, by contrast, children are raised by extended families,
with scores of relatives within the tribe sharing their oversight. It is com-
mon for the biological parents to leave children with relatives for ex-
tended periods.
In the past, state welfare workers often perceived these child-rearing
practices of Native American parents as abandonment or neglect of their
children. As a result, state authorities removed large numbers of Native
American children from their families and placed them for adoption with
middle-class white families,39 to the consternation of Native American
tribe leaders. Eventually, Congress stepped in and enacted a federal stat-
ute providing that whenever a Native American child is placed for adop-
tion, the tribe to which his parents belong has a preferential right to
adopt the child.'
But sometimes Native American parents, drawing away from tribal
custom, want their child to be adopted by persons who are not members
of the tribe. In a recent Supreme Court case, Mississippi Band of Choc-
taw Indians v. Holyfield,4 two Native American parents deliberately left
their tribe so that their child would be born in another state, and ar-
ranged for its adoption by a nontribal couple.
The tribe sued to invalidate the adoption and won. The Supreme
Court affirmed. Under the federal statute, the Court held, the tribe had
an interest in the child that was separate from, and possibly superior to,
the interest of the child's biological parents. Accordingly, the tribe's in-
terest in the adoption was not extinguished simply because the parents
wanted the child to be adopted out of the tribe.
The result is problematic. While Native Americans form a distinct
subculture within American society, with traditions very different from
39. See H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-11, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 7530, 7530-33.
40. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1923 (1982).
41. 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
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those of the majority of Americans, Native Americans are also citizens of
the United States. To what extent can the rights of the tribe override
their members' rights as individuals? Suppose, for instance, that it was
the tribal custom for children to be raised communally as soon as the
children were weaned. If a Native American mother wanted to raise her
child untraditionally, as her own, could a congressional statute mandate
that the child be raised by the tribe? I would expect that even a Supreme
Court dedicated to recognizing and empowering the distinctive culture of
Native American tribes would have difficulty in affirming that result.
Holyfield is another illustration of the pivotal role our courts continue
to play in mediating disputes between ethnic groups and a central gov-
ernment that presumably represents the entire nation. Group rights need
to be respected, but when they conflict with the rights of a larger society,
sharp edges must be planed down. No constitution can contemplate the
infinite variety of such conflicts, and legislatures can deal only with some.
Frequently, our courts end up as the final forum; their choices can unite
or divide the total society. A final example makes the point.
Our constitution expressly protects the free exercise of religion, and
our society has always been sanctuary to a multitude of religions. Pro-
tection of this diversity is bedrock constitutional doctrine. It sometimes
happens, however, that a religious practice conflicts with a state law that
regulates conduct generally. That was the case in Employment Division
v. Smith,42 decided in April of this year. Certain Native American
churches have as one of their sacraments the ingestion of peyote, a drug
whose possession is generally proscribed under narcotics laws. While a
number of states had resolved this conflict by providing that the religious
use of peyote was exempt from the drug laws, the state of Oregon had
not. When Alfred Smith and Galen Black lost their jobs because of their
sacramental use of peyote, the state deemed them ineligible for employ-
ment benefits.
In prior cases of this sort, the Court had balanced the individual's in-
terest in free exercise of religion against the state's interest in general
prohibitions, and often ruled in favor of the individual. The Court had
held that a state cannot deny unemployment benefits to someone who
lost her job because she would not work on the Sabbath,43 and had pro-
tected the right of the Amish, on religious grounds, to claim exemption
from compulsory education laws for children over sixteen." Yet in
Smith, the Court stated flatly that it had "never held that an individual's
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate."45 Future cases will
determine whether Smith represents a hard retreat from the Court's pre-
vious sensitivity to the comparative needs of society and the individual,
42. 490 U.S. 30 (1990).
43. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-10 (1963).
44. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
45. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600.
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and accords the state an indisputable power to burden religion even
where the state's need to do so is not strong. The Court's role in creating
and preserving "one nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all" is
an enduring one; its work is by no means finished, its final marks are not
yet complete.
V. THE JUDICIAL CHALLENGE
I close with these thoughts: as we head into the twenty-first century
and democracy surges into new lands without long constitutional tradi-
tions, the structuring of a cohesive society that retains diversity and plu-
ralism must surely be a paramount priority, for ourselves and for these
new societies. Fresh waves of immigration bring new non-European sub-
cultures into our nation; many of these do not want simply to be ab-
sorbed into our mainstream culture, they want to retain vital aspects of
their own; others want full equality of treatment as citizens and a release
from tribal or group control. Courts of the future will be challenged to
mediate justly the often conflicting demands for equality, diversity and
national integrity. To accomplish this, our judicial system must itself
reflect an acceptance of the many cultures in our nation; there must be
diversity in the make up of our courts and justice system, not as repre-
sentatives of their cultures per se but as symbols of a common dedication
to a unified vision of civic justice and equality. We can speculate whether
Korematsu would have been decided as it was if an Asian-American had
been on the Supreme Court and ponder the result in Plessy v. Ferguson if
a black were among the Justices. Even with the best of will and the
greatest intelligence, judicial sensitivities to the invasion of basic rights
are at their lowest ebb when judges perceive the victims as markedly dif-
ferent from themselves. In articulating the core values of our nation,
judges must often intuit and draw on textures, patterns and analogies,
even on their own experiences, in ways that fall far from the analytical
modes taught in law schools. When precedents point in opposing direc-
tions, reason alone does not tell a judge how to determine which route to
follow. She needs something more-something that has been called a
"contextual insight ... a situational sense." 46
Our best judges have been creative with history and tradition-Mar-
shall was certainly not a strict constructionist, nor was Holmes. Their
principles emerged from an intuition of justice, a way of understanding a
total situation not just analytically but in context, an empathy with the
plight of the parties before them. I suspect that a preoccupation with
judges who confine themselves to interpreting existing law or deriving
original intent, whatever those code words mean, is not likely to produce
a Marshall or Holmes or Warren or Harlan or Brennan. We have en-
trusted to our courts a large responsibility for ultimately protecting the
cultural neighborhoods within our national community. For that task,
46. Karst, supra note 3, at 198.
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we need a judiciary as broadly based as society so as to reflect the whole
American experience, one that acknowledges the creativity and discre-
tionary side of its mission rather than assuming the role of judicial sleuth
looking for buried clues in sterile law books. The law, we are told, can
never "be reduced to a set of tidy formulas applied mechanistically to the
actual situations that arise in real people's lives;" it is rather "the whole
process" by which norms to govern behavior are articulated, interpreted,
modified, adopted and applied.47
If it were possible to impart any single instruction about constitutions,
courts, diversity and indivisibility to our new democratic friends all over
the world, I would choose this. The judges they select will contribute
mightily to their nations' viability. They should be selected for inteffli-
gence and learning, of course, but also for compassion, empathy, toler-
ance, character and diversity of experience. In their rulings affecting the
rights of many cultures and peoples fighting for an equality they have not
heretofore known, they have it within their means to determine whether
democracy will survive.
47. Karst, supra note 3, at 236.
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